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Events in a sequence may each be evaluated as good or bad. We propose that such
good-bad evaluations evoke emotional responses that change current mood. A model
of recurrent updating of current mood is developed and compared to a model of
how a sequence of events evoking emotional responses is evaluated retrospectively.
In Experiment 1, 149 undergraduates are presented sequences of lottery outcomes with
a fixed probability of losing or winning different amounts of money. Ratings of current
mood are made after the sequence. Retrospective evaluations are either made after the
ratings of current mood or, in a control condition, when no ratings of current mood are
made. The results show an expected effect on current mood of the valence of the end
of the sequence. The results are less clear in showing an expected beginning effect on
the retrospective evaluations. An expected beginning effect on retrospective evaluations
is found in Experiment 2 in which 41 undergraduates are first asked to remember the
different amounts of money, then to evaluate the sequence as lottery outcomes.
Keywords: sequence of events, instant utility, remembered utility, emotional response, current mood
INTRODUCTION
A choice frequently results in a sequence of outcomes extended in time. Everyday examples include
making a journey, reading a novel, viewing a movie, or listening to a concert. Other examples
from professional life are investors encountering returns on investments, doctors prescribing
multiple medical treatments or researchers conducting multiple studies. In this article, we ask how
evaluations are made of sequences of events that may or may not be outcomes of choices, and when
and how the evaluations evoke emotional responses.
A relevant distinction is made by Schreiber and Kahneman (2000) between instant utility and
remembered utility. Instant utility is an evaluation of each event in a sequence. Remembered utility
is the retrospectively aggregated evaluation of the sequence of instant utilities. In previous research
(e.g., Ariely, 1998; Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000) an evaluation has been assumed to be identical
to an emotional response. Yet, an evaluation that has a hedonic tone does not invariably evoke an
emotional response (Russell, 2003). Therefore, we distinguish an evaluation of a choice outcome as
good or bad (instant utility) from an emotional response to the outcome. A comedy movie may be
funny but may not evoke an emotional response unless the evaluation has bearings on the viewer’s
reality. Sad music may be perceived as such without making the listener feel sad if it is no threat to
well-being.
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In this paper our aim is to investigate the emotions people
experience during a sequence of events and their memory of
these emotions. We assume that people invariably experience a
non-transient background emotion referred to as current mood
(Diener et al., 2015). Occasionally an event evokes an emotional
response experienced against this background (Lazarus, 1991).
In one of two models we propose that emotional responses to
events influence current mood through a process of recurrent
updating. A reported current mood after a sequence of events
is therefore a temporary state in this updating process. In the
second model, recall of the updated current moods is the result
of reconstruction from memory of the instantaneous impacts
on current mood of the emotional responses. A retrospective
evaluation of the sequence is made by averaging the recalled
mood impacts. In the next two sections we present these two
models followed by hypotheses derived from the models. We
then report two experiments to test the hypotheses.
CURRENT MOOD
Russell (2003) posits that core affects are elemental building
blocks involved in all moods and emotions. More precisely, a
core affect is a “neurophysiological state consciously accessible
as the simplest raw (non-reflective) feelings evident in moods
and emotions” (p. 148). Core affects are always accessible, either
being neutral or having any other value in a dimensional system
defined by the orthogonal axes pleasure-displeasure (valence)
and activation-deactivation (activation) (Russell, 1980, 2003; Yik
et al., 2011; Kuppens et al., 2013). Several different methods
to measure affect [self-reports, pheripheral physiology, startle
responses, electroencephalography (EEG) or face expressions
measured with electromyography (EMG)] support a dimensional
description although not all methods converge on the two
dimensions of valence and activation (or arousal) (Mauss
and Robinson, 2009). Additional corroboration of the valence
and activation dimensions comes from neuro-imaging research
(Posner et al., 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013).
Russell (2003) defines mood as a prolonged core affect that
presumably is both influenced by changes in internal states
(e.g., bodily changes, ruminations, or similar mental contents)
and by emotional responses to external events (e.g., Verduyn
et al., 2009, 2011). The changes in mood are likely to be
less transient and weaker than the emotional responses. We
propose that current mood (a self-assessment of the form “how
I feel now”) is a non-transient emotion that is recurrently and
instantaneously updated if the evaluations of events (instant
utilities) evoke emotional responses.1 This is represented by the
following equation relating current mood (CMi) at time i (ǫ 1,...,
1According to several emotion theories (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1990; Lazarus,
1991; Oatley, 2009), an emotional response (also referred to as emotion, emotion
episode, or feeling) is evoked if the evaluation of an event has personal relevance,
for instance, that attainment of a positive personal consequence is facilitated or a
negative personal consequence avoided (Carver, 2001). Whether or not this is a
necessary condition is not essential here. Yet, the distinction between evaluation
and emotional response is important. It would be unrealistic and inconsistent with
previous research (e.g., Diener et al., 2015) that every good-bad evaluation would
evoke emotional responses.
n) to current mood at time i–1 and the instant utility (IUi) of an
event at time i varying on a single continuum X,
CMi =


CMi−1 + (CMmax − CMi−1)
(
1− exp (−φiIUi)
)
IUi ≥ 0; 0 ≤ φi ≤ 1
CMi−1 + (CMi−1 − CMmin)
(
1− exp (φiIUi)
)
IUi < 0
(1)
The instant utility IUi has an impact on CMi that depends on φi
varying from no impact (0) if the instant utility does not evoke
an emotional response to an impact that is equally large as the
instant utility (1). The degree of change is limited by CMmax =
−CMmin > 0.
2 We further propose that the instant utility (IU)
is represented by prospect theory’s value function (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Carter and
McBride, 2013), where c is an adaptation level (Baucells et al.,
2011) which determines whether X is evaluated as good or
bad, aG a weight placed on a good evaluation (X–c > 0), aB a
weight placed on a bad evaluation (X–c < 0), and b a curvature
parameter,
IU =
{
−aB|X − c|
b c < X; aB, b > 0
aG(X − c)
b c ≤ X; aG, b > 0
(2)
In prospect theory, the instant utility (IU) is a non-linear function
of X (0 < b < 1) and a bad evaluation has a stronger impact of X
than a good evaluation has (aB > aG).
Note that equations 1 and 2 imply that mood is
unidimensional, whereas mood was above defined as a prolonged
core affect that varies in both valence and activation. Kron et al.
(2015) found that physiological indicators of emotions elicited
by visual stimuli were related to valence but only weakly to
activation, and since previous research has demonstrated a
weak positive linear correlation (e.g., Västfjäll and Gärling,
2007), valence and activation may be combined additively
to a single dimension that varies from positive valence and
high activation to negative valence and low activation. This
corresponds to a dimension in the affect grid ranging from
elation to disappointment (Västfjäll and Gärling, 2002, 2006),
implying that valence is amplified by activation (Kahneman and
Miller, 1986; Mellers, 2000).
RECALLED MOOD IMPACTS
A question people may ask retrospectively is “How did I feel
in the recent past?” This is also the question researchers ask
participants in studies of emotional well-being (e.g., Diener
and Lucas, 2000). It has been proposed that such retrospective
evaluations depend on the aggregation of instant utilities
(Kahneman, 2000a,b). Several studies have demonstrated a peak-
end aggregation rule (e.g., Ariely, 1998; Schreiber andKahneman,
2000; Redelmeier et al., 2003; Langer et al., 2005; for review
see Fredrickson, 2000). According to this rule the final outcome
2We posit theoretically an upper limit to a positive mood and a lower limit to
a negative mood. In a similar vein Linville and Fischer (1991) suggested that
people have limited resources to savour positive feelings and to suffer fromnegative
feelings.
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(end) and themost intense outcome (peak) are averaged. The rule
is thus a special case of a general averaging rule which has been
contrasted to an additive rule (e.g., Cojuharenco and Ryvkin,
2008; Seta et al., 2008a,b). Belowwe propose a weighted averaging
rule.
For a demarcated sequence of events (e.g., a journey, a
concert) that evoke emotional responses such that current mood
changes, the evaluation of the sequence may depend on an
aggregation of the recalled moods during the sequence. This
would be consistent with our model of how mood changes
with emotional responses evoked by evaluations of the events
in the sequence. However, the argument has been empirically
supported that emotions are only possible to reconstruct from
memory of their determinants (Robinson and Clore, 2002a,b).
The implication is hence that people are not able to recall
their previous current moods. Our proposed alternative is
that the aggregated retrospective evaluation of how one felt
is a recalled weighted average of distorted memories of the
impacts on mood of each evaluation. Thus, it is not the
mood or the emotional response that is recalled, but each
evaluation’s impact on mood. In line with the judgment
model proposed by Schwarz and Strack (1999), the aggregated
evaluation may also be influenced by current mood at the
time of recall. It follows from our proposition that distortions
due to recall from memory would influence the aggregated
mood impacts of evaluations of the events in the sequence.
Reflecting the operation of the serial position effect in free
recall of a sequence of to-be-remembered items (e.g., Davelaar
et al., 2005), mood impacts on evaluations in the beginning
(primacy) and end (recency) are expected to be more easily
recalled.3 Furthermore, time decay may dampen the memory
of the mood impacts on the evaluations. In the following
model aggregated recalled impacts on mood (recalled mood
impacts or RMI) at time n+1 are related to the mood impacts
of evaluations of each of n events that evoked emotional
responses,
RMIn+1 =


αCMn+1 + (1− α)
(
1
n
) n∑
1
γCMmax(
1− exp (−δφiIUi)
)
IUi ≥ 0
αCMn+1 + (1− α)
(
1
n
) n∑
1
γCMmin(
1− exp (δφiIUI)
)
IUi < 0
(3)
where γ =
(
β
(
i−1
n−1
)s
+ (1− β)
(
n−i
n−1
)s)
; 0α,β ≤
1; s > 1; 0 < δ <
φi.
Note that the recall of the mood impacts on evaluations varies
from 0 when IUi = 0 or δ = 0 to CMmax = −CMmin > 0. The
parameter α determines the degree of influence of current mood
at the time of recall. The limiting cases are that only current
mood has an influence, thus resulting in the same answer to the
questions “How do I feel now?” as “How did I feel?” or that
3In general, it is assumed that in free recall primacy reflects retrieval of information
stored in long-term memory and recency information being held in short-term
memory at the time of recall (Davelaar et al., 2005).
current mood has no influence. We propose that α increases
with difficulty in retrieving from memory the mood impacts.
If no impacts are retrieved, current mood is thus reported in
response to the question of how one felt during the sequence.
The parameter β in conjunction with the parameter s captures the
weights placed on the beginning and end of the sequence. Here
the limiting cases are that there will only be a beginning or only an
end effect. The parameter δ is the dampening factor accounting
for underestimation of the mood impacts of the evaluations.
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
In this paper, we report two experiments to investigate how
current mood (CM) and recalled mood impacts (RMI) are
differently influenced by a sequence of events that evoke
emotional responses. We use short sequences of monetary
outcomes (referred to as lottery outcomes) having a fixed
probability of losing or winning different amounts of money.
Since lottery outcomes are frequently used in studies of choice
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 2002), our events represent
a natural operationalization of instant utility. Gehring and
Willoughby (2002) also inferred from brain scans emotional
responses to sequences of monetary gains and losses. Langer et al.
(2005) used experienced monetary outcomes (referred to as a
“consumption streams”) in a study of evaluations of sequences.
In order to avoid that participants add the outcomes as they did
in their experiments, participants were informed that they would
receive one randomly chosen lottery outcome. We assume then
that each lottery outcome evokes an emotional response that
increases with its size, either positive or negative depending on
whether it is a potential gain or loss.
The sequences of lottery outcomes that we present in the
experiments are shown in Table 1. In two sequences all 20
outcomes are losses (referred to as a negative beginning and a
negative end), in two sequences 10 losses are followed by 10
gains (negative beginning and positive end), in two sequences 10
gains are followed by 10 losses (positive beginning and negative
end), and in two sequences all 20 outcomes are gains (positive
beginning and positive end). In order to show theoretically how
current mood changes with the gains and losses in the different
sequences, in Figure 1 current mood (CMi) calculated by means
of equations 1 and 2 is plotted against order (i) in the sequence for
three different levels of mood impact (φi > 0) that are constant
for all i. We set CM0 = 0 and CMIN = −CMAX = 3 in equation
1, and aG = aL/2 = 0.02 and b =.75 in equation 2.
4 Averages
are calculated across the two replicates of each of the different
sequences in Table 1. As can be seen, the differences between
the sequences with positive ends and those with negative ends
(end effects) are larger than the differences between the sequences
with positive beginnings and those with negative beginnings
(beginning effects). We thus expect that there will be end effects
that are larger than the beginning effects. It should also be noted
4The values of the parameters aB ,aG ,and b are selected to be approximately
consistent with the findings in a vast number of empirical studies (e.g. Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; McBride, 2010). Setting CMIN = −CMAX = 3 is consistent
with the boundaries of the rating scale used in the experiments.
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TABLE 1 | Sequences of lottery outcomes (in SEK) presented in the
experiments.
Negative beginning Positive beginning
Negative end Positive end Negative end Positive end
Position in
sequence
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 −27 −19 −19 −27 3 6 3 6
2 −30 −13 −13 −30 28 38 28 38
3 −19 −4 −4 −19 18 46 18 46
4 −2 −15 −15 −2 45 20 45 20
5 −8 −48 −48 −8 38 44 38 44
6 −41 −9 −9 −41 8 23 8 23
7 −32 −29 −29 −32 6 9 6 9
8 −49 −14 −14 −49 13 19 13 19
9 −39 −35 −35 −39 47 3 47 3
10 −4 −43 −43 −4 23 43 23 43
11 −19 −27 3 6 −19 −27 6 3
12 −13 −30 28 38 −13 −30 38 28
13 −4 −19 18 46 −4 −19 46 18
14 −15 −2 45 20 −15 −2 20 45
15 −48 −8 38 44 −48 −8 44 38
16 −9 −41 8 23 −9 −41 23 8
17 −29 −32 6 9 −29 −32 9 6
18 −14 −49 13 19 −14 −49 19 13
19 −35 −39 47 3 −35 −39 3 47
20 −43 −4 23 43 −43 −4 43 23
that the differences between the end effects and beginning effects
increase with the mood impact of the emotional responses.
We similarly make theoretical predictions of recalled mood
impacts (RMIn+1) after the end of the sequence (i = n = 20).
In Figure 2 RMIn+1 calculated by means of equation 3 (for α
= 0, s = 2, aG = aL/2 = 1, b = 0.75, and CMIN = −CMAX
= 3) is plotted against β varying from 0 to 1 for three levels of
dampening (δ). The beginning and end effects are below plotted
against β . It can be seen that the size of the beginning and end
effects vary.
Our theoretical results substantiated by the plots in Figures 1,
2 are that for the sequences of lottery outcomes in Table 1
current mood would always yield an end effect, whereas recalled
mood impacts of the evaluations would yield both a beginning
and an end effect given that both beginning and end are
remembered. Based on these theoretical results we attempt to
distinguish between current mood and recalled mood impacts
by investigating conditions under which an end effect would be
observed for current mood and a beginning and end effect for
recalled mood effects.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1 we test the hypothesis that current mood is
only influenced by the end of a sequence of lottery outcomes
evoking emotional responses, whereas recalled mood impacts are
influenced by both the beginning and end. In order to prevent
thinking back on the lottery outcomes such that the ratings
of how participants felt during the sequence would influence
current mood, participants are asked to perform the allegedly
unrelated task of rating how they feel when viewing a nature
picture immediately after being presented the lottery outcomes.
They are then asked to rate how they felt during the sequence.
In a control condition other participants only rate how they felt
during the sequence.
Method
Participants
Participants were 87 undergraduates (50 women; mean age
23.55 years, standard deviation = 3.63 years, and range 18–
36 years) at Karlstad University enrolled in different study
programs. They volunteered to participate in compensation for
SEK 50 (approximately equivalent to USD 8) for showing up
and the opportunity of earning an additional SEK 100 as a
lottery outcome. Between 20 and 24 participants were randomly
assigned to each of four between-groups conditions.
Another 62 participants (45 women; mean age 24.18 years,
standard deviation= 4.93 years, and range 19–40 years) from the
same pool of undergraduates volunteered to participate for the
same compensation in a control condition conducted separately.
Between 15 and 16 participants were randomly assigned to the
same four between-groups conditions.
Material
Each participant was presented with a sequence of 20 potential
lottery outcomes (seeTable 1), either 20 gains (positive beginning
and end), 20 losses (negative beginning and end), 10 losses
before 10 gains (negative beginning and positive end), or 10
gains before 10 losses (positive beginning and negative end). Two
part-sequences consisting of 10 gains were obtained by random
sampling without replacement of numbers in the interval 1 to
49 and another two part-sequences consisting of 10 losses were
obtained by random sampling without replacement of numbers
in the interval –1 to –49. In combining the part-sequences to full
sequences (20 lottery outcomes), two replicates were constructed
of each full sequence (two of each of 20 gains, 20 losses, 10 gains
before 10 losses, and 10 losses before 10 gains). The replicates
were presented about equally often across participants.
Experimental Design
The experimental design was a randomized factorial with two
between-groups factors (positive vs. negative valence of the
beginning of the sequence X positive vs. negative valence of
the end of the sequence) and one within-groups factor (ratings
of current mood vs. recalled mood impacts). In the control
condition the experimental design was replicated except that
participants only rated recalled mood impacts.
Procedure
Participants serving in groups of 2 to 8 were seated in a room in
front of a large screen. As shown in Figure 3 a nature picture5 was
first shown on the screen for 20 s to minimize initial differences
in current mood. The instructions were then presented as text
5Nature views have in several studies (e.g., Hartig et al., 2003) been shown to
influence feelings.
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FIGURE 1 | Current mood (CM) plotted against position in the sequence of lottery outcomes (i) for three levels of mood impact (8). (Current mood is
calculated by means of equation 1 with CM0 = 0, CMMAX = − CMMIN = 3, and ηi = 0, and equation 2 with aG = aL/2 = 0.02 and b = 0.75. Note that the
beginning and end effects at i = 20 are divided by 2 to not exceed the range of the Y-axis).
on the screen as well as aurally from a loud speaker. Participants
were told that they were endowed with SEK 50 as a buy-in
to a lottery before being presented the following instructions
(translated from the Swedish): “You will now be presented a
sequence of potential lottery outcomes. As will be shown on the
screen, the sequence consists of a number of chances to increase
or decrease the SEK 50 you have been given. One lottery outcome
will be randomly selected after that all have been presented. Your
endowment of SEK 50 may increase to SEK 100 or decrease to SEK
0 depending on which lottery outcome that is selected. After the
sequence you will be asked to answer a number of questions.”
After the instructions had been presented, the lottery
outcomes were each presented for 4 s appearing on the screen as
if being added to or deducted from the endowment of SEK 50
(represented by a picture of a 50-SEK note6) (see Figure 4), for
instance SEK 50 + SEK 10, or as being deducted from SEK 50,
for instance SEK 50–SEK 10.
After that the lottery outcomes had been presented,
participants turned to the first page in a booklet on a table in
6A picture of the note was used because previous research (Raghubir, 2006)
suggests that a note may evoke a stronger emotional response than only the
monetary amount presented in digits.
front of them and read the instructions printed on this page.
Another nature picture was shown for 8 s while participants rated
how they felt (current mood). The ratings were made on four 7-
point unipolar scales appearing on the next page of the booklet.
The scales that ranged from 0 (not at all) to 6 (extremely much)
were defined by the adjectives glad, sad, active, and passive.
Thereafter, when the picture was no longer shown, participants
turned to the next page in the booklet and rated on another set
of identical scales how they had felt during the lottery outcomes
(recalled mood impacts). The instructions read “Think back
about the lottery outcomes and rate on the scales how you felt when
you saw them.” In the control condition no nature picture was
shown after the sequence of lottery outcomes and participants
were only asked to rate how they felt during the lottery
outcomes.
At the end of the session questions were asked about
participants’ experiences of the lottery outcomes followed
by background questions. Participants were finally informed
about which lottery outcome was selected. In connection with
debriefing, all participants were then paid their compensation of
SEK 50 for showing up and an additional SEK 100 if the lottery
outcome was a gain. Sessions lasted for approximately 15min.
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FIGURE 2 | Recalled mood impacts (RMI), beginning effect, and end effect plotted against weight placed on the beginning of the sequence of
monetary outcomes (β) for three levels of memory decay (δ). (Recalled mood impacts is calculated by means of equation 3 with α = 0, CM0 = 0, and CMMAX
= − CMMIN = 3, and equation 2 with aG = aL/2 = 0.02, and b = 0.75).
Results
The ratings were averaged across all four adjective scales after
reversing the 0-to-6 scale ratings of sad and passive to 6-to-0
scales (Y = 6 − X).7 This resulted in Cronbach’s αs of 0.645
for the average ratings of current mood and 0.707 and 0.742
(control condition) for the average recalled mood impacts. A
transformation was then made to -3-to-3 scales. Means and
standard deviations are given in Table 2 related to the valence
7We aggregated all the ratings to obtain a single measure varying from positive
valence and high activation (elation) to negative valence and low activation
(disappointment) (Västfjäll and Gärling, 2002, 2007). Aggregation was justified by
the acceptable sizes of the Cronbach’s as.
(gain or loss) of the beginning and end of the sequences of lottery
outcomes.
An end effect (0.66) and no beginning effect (−0.08) are as
expected observed for the ratings of current mood,8 whereas
both a beginning and an end effect (0.24 and 0.67; and in the
control condition 0.37 and 0.24) are observed for the ratings
of recalled mood impacts. However, a 2 (beginning: Positive vs.
negative) X 2 (end: Positive vs. negative) X 2 (ratings: Current
8The beginning effect is calculated as the difference between the means of the
sequences with positive beginnings and those with negative beginnings, whereas
the end effect is calculated as the difference between the means of the sequences
with positive ends and those with negative ends.
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FIGURE 3 | The time sequence of activities in Experiment 1. (Broken lines
indicate that time was not fixed but dependent on when participants finished).
mood vs. recalled mood impacts) analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with repeated measures on the last factor excluding the control
condition only yielded significant main effects of the ratings
(Mcurrent mood = 0.65 vs. Mrecalled mood impacts = 0.32), F(1, 83) =
5.21, p= 0.025, partial ω2 = 0.046, and of the end (Mpositive end =
0.81 vs.Mnegative end = 0.15), F(1, 83) = 7.10, p= 0.009, partial ω
2
= 0.066.
The expected three-way interaction between ratings and
beginning and end did thus not reach significance, F(1, 83) < 1.
A possible reason is the influence of current mood on the ratings
of mood impacts. In order to substantiate this interpretation,
a mediation analysis (MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao et al., 2014) was
performed. The correlation between current mood and recalled
mood impacts was overall .566 (p < 0.001), varying between
0.443 and 0.606 in the different conditions. In linear regression
analyses end had a significant effect on current mood (b =
0.33, SE = 0.11, p = 0.004) and a marginally significant effect
on recalled mood impacts (b = 0.32, SE = 0.17, p = 0.057).
Current mood was significant (b = 0.82, SE = 0.14, p < 0.001)
when entered in a regression analysis on recalled mood impacts,
whereas the end effect did not remain significant (b= 0.06, SE=
0.15, p= 0.713). In a Sobel test the indirect effect was significant,
z = 2.65, p < 0.008, and as Figure 5 shows, current mood fully
mediates the end effect on recalled mood impacts.
An additional 2 (ratings: Recall mood impacts after ratings of
current mood vs. no ratings of current mood) X 2 (beginning:
Positive vs. negative) X 2 (end: Positive vs. negative) ANOVA
was performed on recalled mood impacts including the control
condition. All the interactions with ratings were non-significant
(Fs < 1), thus failing to find significant effects of whether the
ratings of recalled mood impacts were made after the mood
ratings or if no ratings of current mood were made. The main
effect of the end approached significance, F(1, 143) = 3.44, p
= 0.066, partial ω2 = 0.016, whereas the main effect of the
beginning marginally failed to reach significance, F(1, 143) = 2.12,
p= 0.120, partial ω2 = 0.007.
Discussion
The results showed as expected from equations 1 and 2 an end
effect on the ratings of current mood. Not as expected however,
no interaction with ratings was significant suggesting that there
was no beginning effect on the ratings of recalled mood impacts.
One reason for this may be that, as specified in equation 3 and
substantiated by themediation analysis, current mood influenced
recalled mood impacts. Yet, the beginning effect was larger
for recalled mood impacts than current mood. Statistically, the
results in the control condition did not differ. It is still noteworthy
FIGURE 4 | An example of the lottery outcomes presented to the
participants.
that in the control condition the end effect was weaker as would
be expected if there is no influence of current mood.
The significant overall difference between the ratings of
current mood and recalled mood impacts appears to be
inconsistent with that the former is dependent on the latter.
One possible explanation is that the positive current mood
was inflated similarly for all participants when they viewed the
nature picture and then reverted back when the picture was
no longer shown during recall of the mood impacts. For this
reason then, recalled mood impacts after the ratings of current
mood were presumably influenced by this reduced current mood.
Furthermore, in the absence of the ratings of current mood,
recalled mood impacts were presumably for the same reason
lower when no nature picture was shown.
It is possible that the mediation of current mood on recalled
mood impacts is due to a failure to recall themood impacts. Thus,
the ratings of current mood were substituted for recall of mood
impacts when not possible or difficult to recall.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2 we investigate whether improved memory of
the sequence of lottery outcomes would result in a beginning
and end effect in recalled emotion impacts. We first present a
sequence of monetary amounts without disclosing that they are
lottery outcomes until after their presentation. If the monetary
amounts are not perceived as gains or losses, no effects on the
ratings of current mood are expected before the disclosure. After
the disclosure and if the participants remember the beginning
and end of the sequence, we expect beginning and effects on the
ratings of recalled mood impacts.
Method
Participants
Another 41 undergraduates (19 women; mean age 25.9 years,
standard deviation = 6.2, and range 20–48 years) at Karlstad
University volunteered to participate in compensation for SEK
50 for showing up and being promised a performance-dependent
additional maximal sum of SEK 100. Twenty participants were
randomly assigned to a “positive beginning—negative end”
condition and 21 participants randomly assigned to a “negative
beginning—positive end” condition.
Procedure
The sequences of lottery outcomes (instead referred to as
monetary amounts) consisted of the two replicates presented in
Table 1 with a negative beginning followed by a positive end
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TABLE 2 | Mean ratings (and standard deviations) of current mood and recalled mood impacts related to negative vs. positive beginning and negative vs.
positive end (experiment 1).
Negative beginning Positive beginning
Negative end Positive end Negative end Positive end
M (Sd) M (Sd) M (Sd) M (Sd)
Ratings of current mood 0.25 (1.37) 0.97 (0.81) 0.38 (1.00) 0.99 (0.98)
Ratings of recalled mood impacts after current mood −0.10 (1.90) 0.50 (1.34) 0.07 (1.53) 0.80 (1.58)
Ratings of recalled mood impacts independent of current mood (control condition) −0.33 (1.21) 0.11 (1.46) 0.23 (1.38) 0.28 (1.33)
The ratings vary from −3 to 3.
FIGURE 5 | Unstandardized regression coefficients from mediation analysis (Experiment 1).
and the two replicates with a positive beginning followed by
a negative end. The procedure was the same as in the main
condition of Experiment 1, with two mood ratings and the
presentation of a nature picture before and after the sequence of
monetary amounts. In the instructions participants were told that
they would later be asked to remember the monetary amounts.
They were further told that they would have SEK 50 as a buy-
in to a lottery after the recall task. Following the sequence of
monetary outcomes, participants were asked to rate how they feel
(current mood) while watching the second nature picture. The
instructions and rating scales were the same as in the preceding
experiment. When the ratings of current mood had been made
and the nature picture was no longer shown, additional written
instructions informed participants that one monetary amount
of those presented would be randomly selected such that their
endowment of SEK 50 may increase to maximally SEK 100 or
be reduced to minimally SEK 0 depending on which monetary
amount was selected. They were then asked to rate on the same
scales how they felt (recalledmood impacts) when thinking about
the monetary amounts. Participants were finally asked to recall
themonetary amounts in any order. Their answers were recorded
on an answer sheet with 30 unnumbered lines.
The sessions lasted for about 15 min including the same
post-experimental questions as in the preceding experiment,
announcing and paying the compensation (SEK 100 to everyone),
and debriefing.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 displays for each sequence of monetary amounts means
and standard deviations of the ratings of current mood and of
recalled mood impacts averaged as in the preceding experiment.
Cronbach αs were 0.639 for the average ratings of current mood
and 0.748 for the average ratings of recalled mood impacts. Mean
number recalled gains and losses are also shown in the table. Each
recalled monetary amount below SEK 50 was scored as a loss and
each amount above SEK 50 as a gain.
In support of the hypothesis, the results differed for the
ratings of current mood and recalled mood impacts. A 2 (ratings:
Current mood vs. recalled mood impacts) X 2 (sequence: Positive
beginning and negative end vs. negative beginning and positive
end) ANOVA yielded no significant main effects, F(1, 39) <
1, for ratings, and F(1, 39) = 2.65, p = 0.112, partial ω
2 =
0.039, for sequence, and a marginally significant interaction
between ratings and sequence, F(1, 39) = 4.04, p = 0.051, partial
ω2 = 0.069. As expected, current mood did not change but
recalled emotion impacts did. In an independent-samples t-test
the sequence of monetary amounts had no significant effect
on the ratings of current mood, t(39) < 1. This should be
compared to the results of Experiment 1 reported in Table 2
yielding a large difference between the same two sequences
(Mnegative beginning/positive end = 0.97 vs.Mpositive beginning/negative end
= 0.38). In contrast, sequence had an expected significant effect
on the ratings of recalled mood impacts, t(39) = 2.28, p = 0.028,
d = 0.730. Its direction suggests it is a beginning effect.
That sequence has a beginning effect on recalled mood
impacts is also supported by that more gains are recalled when
presented first in the sequences and recalled mood impacts is
positive, but that more losses are recalled when presented first
in the sequences and recalled mood impacts are negative. A
(sequence of monetary amounts: Positive beginning and negative
end vs. negative beginning and positive end) X 2 (recall: Gains
vs. losses) ANOVA showed that both the main effect of gains vs.
losses and the interaction between gains vs. losses and sequence
were significant, F(1, 39) = 8.86, p = 0.005, partial ω
2 = 0.161,
and F(1, 39) = 27.90, p < 0.001, partial ω
2 = 0.396. When
gains precede losses in the sequence of monetary amounts,
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TABLE 3 | Mean ratings (and standard deviations) of current mood and
recalled mood impacts and mean number recalled gain and loss lottery
outcomes related to sequences with negative beginning and positive end
and positive beginning and negative end (experiment 2).
Negative beginning
and positive end
Positive beginning
and negative end
M (Sd) M (Sd)
Ratings of current mood −0.08 (1.08) 0.16 (1.18)
Ratings of mood impacts −0.40 (1.18) 0.41 (1.12)
Number of recalled gains 3.81 (1.21) 5.55 (1.93)
Number of recalled losses 4.62 (2.84) 2.65 (1.69)
The ratings vary from −3 to 3.
independent-samples t-tests showed that significantly more gains
than losses are recalled, t(39) = 2.54, p = 0.015, d = 0.813, and
when losses precede gains, that significantly more losses than
gains are recalled, t(39) = 2.68, p= 0.011, d = 0.858.
The results support the hypothesis that monetary amounts
fail to change current mood if not identified as gains or losses
such that they do not evoke emotional responses. In contrast,
when monetary amounts are retrospectively identified as lottery
outcomes, the mood impacts of the gains and losses appearing
in the beginning of the sequence are recalled, which results in a
beginning effect on recalled mood impacts. The interference and
delay caused by the ratings of current mood likely suppressed
an end effect on recall and thus an end effect on recalled mood
impacts.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In comparing the results of Experiments 1 and 2 we argue
that support is obtained for the distinction between evaluations
and emotional responses in that the monetary amounts in the
sequence were found to have impacts changing current mood
only when perceived as gains or losses. We further argue that
the results of the experiments are consistent with (i) that current
mood as specified in equations 1 and 2 is updated during the
sequence of gains or losses that evokes emotional responses,
and (ii) that recalled mood impacts as specified in equation 3 is
influenced by current mood at recall as well as by the beginning
of the sequence of mood impacts if it is remembered.
We theoretically expected to observe both beginning and end
effects on recalled mood impacts. In Experiment 1 we found
the expected end (recency) effect on current mood and recalled
mood impacts, but no statistically significant expected beginning
(primacy) effect on recalled mood impacts. The estimated
beginning effect was however larger for recalled mood impacts
than for current mood, in particular in the control condition
when participants did not rate their current mood. In Experiment
2 only a beginning effect and no end effect was observed on
recalled mood impacts. If assuming that the beginning effect
depends on storage and retrieval from long-term memory and
the end effect on recall from short-term memory (Davelaar et al.,
2005), a possible account of the result is that in both experiments
the preceding ratings of current mood interfered with recall
from short-term memory. In Experiment 1 this resulted in a
dependency on current mood, presumably because also long-
term memory retrieval of the beginning was impaired without
explicit instructions to memorize the gains and losses, which
however was not the case in Experiment 2 when participants were
asked to remember themonetary amounts. The account is further
supported by the weaker end effect in the control condition of
Experiment 1 when no ratings of current mood were made. We
acknowledge that this interpretation, although consistent with
the results, is not the only possible and that the support for it
is not strong. Conceptual replications would be highly valuable.
Because we did not measure current mood during the
sequence of lottery outcomes presented to the participants in
the experiments,9 inferences are made from the observed end
effect in Experiment 1. This is consistent with the theoretical
predictions that an end effect should be expected if the outcomes
in the sequence have impacts on current mood. An end effect is
a common finding in previous research examining evaluations
of sequences of emotion stimuli in that linear increases are
more positive than linear decreases (Hsee et al., 1991; Ariely,
1998; Chapman, 2000), and that accelerating increases are more
positive than linear increases whereas accelerating decreases are
less positive than linear decreases (Hsee and Abelson, 1991; Hsee
et al., 1994; Ariely, 1998).
That current mood is updated in response to evaluations of
events that evoke emotional responses is a conceptualization
of how sequences of events have impacts that differs from the
notion of remembered utility proposed in previous research
(Kahneman, 2000a,b). An important difference is that we
make explicit the distinction between evaluation and emotional
response. In the same vein Zauberman et al. (2006) argued
that a distinction should be made between hedonic and
informational descriptive or predictive evaluations. In three
experiments with different stimuli (test performance, defective
products from a factory, service quality) with increasing
or decreasing sequences, they found consistent end effects
(increasing sequences evaluated as more positive than decreasing
sequences) for hedonic evaluations but only for predictive
informational evaluations. Yet, our experiments differed from
those of Zauberman et al. (2006) in that we asked participants
to rate how they themselves felt at the moment when they
were viewing a nature picture instead of how satisfied they
believe another person would be with the sequence. In our
experiments the increasing and decreasing sequences did not
follow a trend but a step function. Our sequences also made
possible to obtain independent estimates of beginning and end
effects.
The explanation proposed by Zauberman et al. (2006) (see
also Ariely and Carmon, 2000) is that expectation based on trend
extrapolation plays an important role. In support of the role of
expectation, in a recent study of mood changes during repeated
choices of gambles, Rutledge et al. (2014) found that expectations
played a more important role than a decaying memory of the
9Repeatedly measuring current mood by means of ratings during the sequence of
potential lottery outcomes would not have been easily tractable or would possibly
have had disruptive effects (Ariely, 1998; Ariely and Zauberman, 2000, 2003).
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accumulated outcomes. Explanations based on expectation and
updating of current mood may however not be incompatible.
Whereas, our explanation focuses on how one feels after a
sequence of events, both how one feel and expectations about
how one will feel in the future may coexist. A question this raises
is what role the past plays?
Awareness of what causes changes in current mood is
presumably low and updating is not likely to impose a substantial
memory load (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007; Mikels et al.,
2008). For this reason current mood may reflect the impact
of previous events without these being remembered. Trend
extrapolation may be a similar process of recurrent updating
that results in an expectation of the future without any memory
of the past. Making these assumptions does of course not
rule out the possibility that some information is remembered.
The peak-end rule (Fredrickson, 2000) is clearly a candidate
conceptualization of what is remembered. Memory decay
resulting in the serial position effect (Davelaar et al., 2005) is
another.
An objection to our proposition that emotional responses
change current mood is that it would seem to imply that
current mood is highly variable. This is not consistent with
the findings of previous research (e.g., Diener and Lucas, 2000;
Diener et al., 2015). However, we propose that the impacts of
emotional responses are dampened, thus current mood varies
less. Furthermore, we do not propose that all events evoke
emotional responses. In real life such events may not occur
frequently. Current moods are therefore likely to be in general
relatively stable.
A number of questions remain to be addressed, theoretically
as well as empirically. A first issue concerns the validity of the
distinction between evaluation and emotional response. It may
seem more plausible to apply the distinction to instant utilities
(Kahneman, 1999) which relies on no or minimal memory
retrieval. Although extended in time, we still claim that updating
is an automatic process minimally dependent on memory similar
to the formation of an instant utility. Additional research is
needed to further investigate this.
The trajectory of updated current mood may also be affected
by changes in internal states (Russell, 2003, 2014; Damasio,
2010), for instance time-dependent changes due to fatigue.
Another change is adaptation resulting in mood reverting to a
positive set-point (Diener et al., 2015). An extended model of the
updating of current mood would need to take this into account.
Another short-coming would seem to be that we do not model
expectations (Rutledge et al., 2014).
It is generally recognized (Isen, 2000) that emotion responses
not only influence current mood but are also influenced by
current mood. Thus, there is possibly a reverse direction of
influence than proposed here. This would still be captured by the
parameters in equation 1, although their interpretation needs to
be extended.
A final issue is what determines a decision to repeat or
not repeat a choice resulting in the sequence of outcomes.
It has been argued that remembered utility is such a
determinant (Kahneman, 2000a,b; Hsee and Hastie, 2006).
We speculate that current mood after a sequence of choice
outcomes may be another determinant of an immediate
repeat decision but not to the same extent if the repeat
decision is delayed. Current mood is also only one input to
a deliberation process that eventually results in a decision
(Damasio, 2010).
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